Abstract: This paper examines the price discovery process in currency markets, basing its analysis on the pivotal distinction between the customer (end-user) market and the interdealer market. It first provides evidence that this price discovery process cannot be based on adverse selection between dealers and their customers, as postulated in standard models, because the spreads dealers quote to their customers are not positively related to a trade's likely information content. The paper then highlights three factors familiar in the literature -fixed operating costs, market power, and strategic dealing -that may explain the crosssectional variation in customers' spreads. The paper finishes by proposing a price discovery process relevant to liquid two-tier markets and providing preliminary evidence that this process applies to currencies.
Introduction
Price discovery, or equivalently the process through which financial prices respond to information, is one of the central concerns of microstructure. Foreign exchange microstructure research typically assumes the price discovery mechanism outlined in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , which focuses on the adverse-selection problem faced by uninformed dealers. To protect themselves from losses to informed customers, dealers rationally quote prices that are "regret-free," meaning they reflect the customer's expected information. This implies that spreads are wider when customers are more likely to be informed, such as when they undertake large trades (Easley and O'Hara, 1987) . Substantial evidence supports the relevance of this theory in U.S. equity markets (Bernhardt and Hughson, 2002; Peterson and Sirri, 2003) .
The relevance of the Glosten-Milgrom (1985) framework for the foreign exchange market was initially suggested in Lyons (1995) , who shows that trade size and interbank spreads were positively related for a particular dealer in 1992. Subsequent exchange rate research assuming the relevance of adverse selection includes Burnside et al.'s (2009) proposed explanation for the forward bias puzzle, Payne's (2003) Hasbrouck-inspired VAR decomposition of interdealer trades and quotes (Hasbrouck, 1991) , and Marsh and O'Rourke's (2005) estimation of Easley et al.'s (1997) PIN using daily customer trade data.
This paper shows that the price discovery process based on Glosten and Milgrom (1985) cannot apply in foreign exchange. This conclusion stems from strong evidence that variation in bid-ask spreads across customers does not conform to the predictions of adverse selection. The paper then suggests three alternative explanations for the pattern of variation in currency spreads across customers. Finally, the paper outlines an alternative price discovery process -new to the literature -that predicts many of the stylized facts of currency market microstructure and is consistent with new evidence presented here.
We estimate three models of spread determination using detailed transaction data from a bank in Germany, specifically the models of Huang and Stoll (1997) , Madhavan and Smidt (1991) , and Glosten and Harris (1988) . None of the models support the relevance of adverse selection. Among other findings contrary to adverse selection, customer spreads are not positively related to trade size.
Indeed, our econometric analysis consistently indicates the reverse pattern: spreads are wider for the trades least likely to carry information. According to dealers, informed trades tend to be large and/or to be placed by financial customers -hedge funds and other asset managers -rather than non-financial ("corporate") customers. Empirical evidence confirms the dealers' view (see Frömmel et al. (2008) and Bjønnes et al. (2011) , inter alia). Since dealer-customer trades are not anonymous, adverse-selection theory predicts wider spreads for larger trades and for financial-customer trades, yet all three estimated models indicate the opposite pattern.
The paper's second contribution is to highlight three factors in the literature that could explain why foreign exchange spreads vary inversely with a trade's likely information content. The first, fixed operating costs, can explain the variation across trade size, because smaller trades require a larger proportionate spread to cover a given absolute cost. The cross-customer variation in spreads can be explained by the second and third factors. The second factor is the transitory "market power" dealers gain from their information about current market conditions (Green et al., 2004) . It can be costly for customers to seek out the best quotes, so any individual dealer has market power during the moment of communicating with the customer, even in a market with hundreds of competitors. Since corporate customers are typically not well informed about market conditions, this could explain why dealers extract wider spreads from corporate customers than from financial customers. The third factor is the advantage to dealers of varying spreads across customers to optimize information flow. Building on theoretical results in Leach and Madhavan (1992) and Naik et al. (1999) as well as empirical evidence that customer order flow carries information (Evans and Lyons, 2007) , we suggest that foreign exchange dealers strategically set narrower spreads to informed customers to gain information from which to profit in subsequent trading. This advantage can be especially strong in liquid two-tier markets like foreign exchange, where dealers exploit the information gathered from customers quickly and at low cost by trading in the interdealer market.
The paper's third contribution is to outline a process through which information brought to the market by customers ultimately becomes embedded in exchange rates. Like the process in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , this process begins with customers that are sometimes informed. In contrast to Glosten and Milgrom, however, the paper proposes that a customer's information is not immediately reflected in the prices quoted to him by a market maker. Instead, the dealer learns whether the informed customer is buying or selling and that information influences prices in the interbank market when the dealer subsequently trades with other dealers. Thereafter, prices quoted to customers finally incorporate the information because they are based on interdealer prices.
This proposed price discovery process, which synthesizes institutional information about the foreign exchange market and abstract concepts already in the literature (Harris, 1998; Foucault, 1999; Reiss and Werner, 2004) , predicts a number of the key stylized facts in foreign exchange microstructure. First, it predicts the positive relation between exchange rate returns and interdealer order flow documented in Evans and Lyons (2002) and related studies. (Order flow is defined as the net of buy-initiated and sellinitiated trades.) It also predicts that the relation should be substantially permanent if dealers are responding to fundamental information, consistent with evidence presented in Payne (2003) and , inter alia. In addition, our proposed price discovery process predicts a positive relation between exchange rate returns and financial order flow, on the one hand, and a non-positive relation between returns and corporate order flow, on the other. Such relations have already been documented in ; Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) ; and Evans and Lyons (2007) , and we document them again using our data. Finally, our proposed price discovery process predicts that the response of exchange rates to financial order flow is substantially permanent, consistent with evidence in . We test two further implications: the likelihood of aggressive interbank trades is higher (i) after larger customer trades than after smaller customer trades and (ii) after financial-customer trades than after corporate-customer trades. The evidence supports these hypotheses.
The paper's microstructure message is directly relevant to the literature on exchange-rate dynamics, which is in some ways analogous to the asset pricing literature within finance. A critical development in exchange rate economics was the recognition that order flow strongly influences returns (Evans and Lyons, 2002) . Though research shows that order flow matters in part because it carries information Lyons, 2002, 2007) , it has not articulated the mechanism through which the customers' information is incorporated into exchange rates. Our proposed price discovery process helps fill this gap.
Our analysis suggests that a market's price discovery process varies according to the market's transaction structure. The familiar adverse-selection based process outlined in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) assumes a one-tier market, so it may not be relevant in markets with active interdealer trading like foreign exchange. Our proposed price discovery process may also be relevant in other liquid two-tier markets, such as the U.S. Treasury market and the London Stock Exchange. The potential relevance of an alternative process for two-tier markets is suggested by evidence showing a negative relation between trade size and spreads on the two-tier London Stock Exchange (Bernhardt et al., 2005) . The mechanism we outline differs, however, from the one outlined in Dunne et al.'s (2008) discussion of the two-tier euro-sovereign bond market. In their model, all customers are equally informed and all trades are the same size, while our analysis features asymmetric information among customers.
Our data comprise the entire USD/EUR transaction record of a single dealer at a bank in Germany during four months in 2001. These data have two advantages relative to other tick-by-tick transaction datasets in foreign exchange: they distinguish between financial and corporate transactions and they include all customer and interdealer trades in the correct order.
Since our sample period the currency market has evolved and new trading systems with enhanced transparency have brought a compression of customer bid-ask spreads (King et al., 2011) . Changes in the market's transaction structure have not, however, changed the underlying reasons most agents trade currencies, so the market's information structure is unlikely to have changed substantially. Financial customers continue to rely on currencies as a store of value so they still have a strong incentive to gather information; non-financial customers continue to use currencies primarily as a medium of exchange so their incentives to gather information are still relatively limited; dealers continue to provide liquidity and bear associated inventory risk so they still have strong incentives to gather information from customers. The wide cross-sectional variation of bid-ask spreads during our sample period thus serves as a magnifying glass for the market's underlying information structure, a structure that might be less easily discerned with more recent data.
The rest of the paper has four sections and a conclusion. Section 2 describes the foreign exchange market and our data. Section 3 shows that customer spreads in foreign exchange are narrowest for the trades most likely to carry information and thus violate the predictions of adverse-selection theory. Section 4 discusses how cross-sectional variation in customer spreads may be explained by fixed operating costs, transitory market power, and strategic dealing. Section 5 articulates our proposed price discovery process and presents supporting evidence. Section 6 concludes.
Foreign exchange market structure and data
The foreign exchange market -or the "FX" market as it is called by market participants -is the world's largest, with daily trading last estimated at $4.0 trillion (Bank for International Settlements, 2010). Though over 100 currencies are traded, the euro, which we study here, is involved in almost onefifth of all trades. Roughly 1,300 dealers compete for business in spot, forward, swap, and derivative contracts (Bank for International Settlements, 2010). Dealers can be found in almost every country, with roughly half of each day's trading accounted for by Tokyo, London, and New York. Banks compete intensely in terms of spreads and also in terms of transaction speed, pricing consistency, trading strategies, electronic products, and the quality of customer relationships (Euromoney, 2007) .
Though the market's transaction technologies are always changing, at its core there are two main segments, or tiers. In the customer segment, dealers provide currency end-users with liquidity in an overthe-counter context. In the interbank segment dealers trade with each other on order-driven exchanges and in the OTC market. The share of the interdealer market has dropped noticeably in recent decades, and it now accounts for less than 40 percent of total trading (Bank for International Settlements, 2010). 1 The contemporary best bid and offer in the interdealer market serve as the anchor for customer prices.
In contrast to equity markets, where individuals can account for half of all trading, the overwhelming majority of banks customers are institutions. Dealers have historically divided their customers into two main categories: financial firms, a group that includes hedge funds, pension funds, and brokerdealers; and "corporates," meaning firms engaged in international trade in goods and services.
Our data comprise the complete USD/EUR transaction record of a bank in Germany over the 87 trading days from July 11, 2001 , to November 9, 2001 . As with all significant FX dealers, the bank offers the full range of FX products, including forwards and derivatives; it serves the full range of customers;
and it participates in the interdealer market as both liquidity provider and liquidity demander. While the bank desires anonymity, we can state that it was included among the banks rated in Euromoney's annual FX poll for 2007, which places it among the top 10 percent of all dealing banks worldwide. Furthermore, in that same poll the bank was among those considered "best" in euro-dollar trading.
For each transaction, we have the following information: (1) date and time; (2) €2.4 million, is bigger than the average corporate-customer trade, at €0.8 million. Figure 1 shows the distribution of trades across the trading day. Financial-customer trades ( Figure 1A ) tend to cluster in the morning, dropping before lunchtime, while corporate-customer trades ( Figure 1B ) rise steadily during the morning, crest around lunchtime (when they also take a brief dip), and decline during the afternoon.
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We include outright forward trades adjusted to a spot-comparable basis by the forward points. This is appropriate, given the institutional structure of forward trading: the customer and the dealing bank first agree on a spot trade in exactly the same manner, and with exactly the same incentives, as they would for regular spot trades. When they later adjust the trade to the appropriate maturity, the associated "forward points" are governed by market-and central-bank determined interest differentials so the bank's own influence on the forward price comes primarily through the spot quotes. We exclude the few transactions over $25 million, since such trades essentially represent a distinct market in which customers hire dealers to manage execution. 3 We also exclude trades with a few corporate customers who have cross-selling agreements with the bank, since the dealer's motivation when quoting to these customers is orthogonal to the strategic considerations on which we focus. According to the bank their quotes to these customers are not intended to be directly profitable but are instead intended to enhance the bank's overall relationship with the customer. The average trade size for these customers is only €0.18 million.
Our main qualitative conclusions should generalize beyond this one dealer for two reasons. First, during our sample period the largest dealer had market share of only about 10 percent. In FX, where the product is liquidity and the price is the bid-ask spread, dealers confirm their limited influence over spreads in surveys showing that their primary consideration is the spreads' "conventional level" (Cheung and Chinn, 2001 ). Our main conclusions should also generalize because our dealer behaves similarly to other dealers described in the literature. As shown in Table 2 (Madhavan and Smidt, 1993) or weeks (Hasbrouck and Sofianos, 1993) .
Over the four months of our sample period, our measure of end-of-day inventory slowly gravitates away from zero and averages -€23 million. This raises the possibility of measurement error, since dealers assert consistently that they typically hold zero inventory overnight and it is possible that euro trades were handled by other traders at our bank if our dealer was away from his desk. This possibility is implicitly acknowledged by a common alternative approach to measuring FX inventory positions, in which inventories are reset to zero nightly (Lyons, 2001 ). When inventory is measured this way, the median inventory half-life is 17 minutes, similar to half-lives calculated in the literature for larger dealers.
The customers in our sample also behave consistently with those analyzed elsewhere in the literature. Cumulative financial and corporate order flow are both I(1), like the exchange rate itself. 4 In addition, as shown in Table 3 , cumulative financial (corporate) order flow is positively (negatively) cointegrated with the exchange rate. Qualitatively consistent results are reported in three studies of large banks -Lyons (2001), Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) , and Evans and Lyons (2007) -as well as a study based on market-wide data for the Swedish krone . This pattern is generally interpreted to mean that, on balance, corporate customers respond to price changes induced by financial-customer liquidity demand Osler, 2009) . Since dealers' end-of-day inventory positions are usually close to zero, one customer group's net trading on a given day must be offset that same day by net trading in the other direction by a different group. The data suggest that financial net demand tends to induce exchange-rate changes which, in turn, induce trading by corporate customers.
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Our sample period includes September 11, 2001, but that day's events do not materially affect our conclusions. Despite the extreme disruption of U.S. bond and stock markets, the FX market functioned smoothly overall. As would be expected in an efficient market subject to major news shocks, volatility and spreads were high on September 11, 2001. But they were indistinguishable from their normal levels by the next day (Mende, 2006) . This resilience stems in part from the large number of FX dealers and their wide geographical dispersion. In addition, Reuters and EBS, the two major electronic brokerages, both have servers in multiple locations around the world performing real-time replication of all functions.
Cross-sectional pattern of currency spreads
This section evaluates whether the cross-sectional pattern of customer spreads in FX is consistent with the predictions of adverse selection. This theory successfully explains the relation between spreads and trade size on the NYSE (see, for example, Bernhardt and Hughson (2002) , Peterson and Sirri (2003) ).
Not only are NYSE spreads wider for larger trades, but some stock brokers pay for order flow from uninformed (retail) customers (Easley et al., 1996) . Adverse selection theory also works well in explaining the pattern of price discrimination among specialists on the non-anonymous Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Theissen, 2003) . There are, however, a number of markets where adverse selection cannot explain the behavior of customer spreads. A negative relationship between spreads and trade size has been documented in the London Stock Exchange (Hansch et al., 1999; Bernhardt et al., 2005) and the U.S. corporate bond market (Goldstein et al., 2007) . A negative relationship between trade size and spreads has also been observed in the relatively illiquid U.S. municipal bond market (Green et al., 2007) .
Our data comprise transaction prices, rather than quotes, so they do not permit us to calculate spreads directly. This difficulty, which is common in the literature, is typically solved by extracting measures of spreads from successive price changes. If spreads were constant across time and across customers and the mid-quote was stable as well, prices would change only when they switched from bid to ask or vice versa, so the spread could be estimated from price changes. In the absence of mid-quote stability the same conclusion still applies if there is no dominant trend. We estimate three familiar models that exploit this insight to extract the adverse-selection and other components of spreads: the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, the Madhavan and Smidt (1991) model, and the Glosten and Harris (1988) model. All three use transaction time rather than clock time. Throughout, we follow standard practice and use generalized method of moments (GMM) with a Newey-West weighting matrix that corrects covariance estimates for potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals.
Each model produces model-specific tests for the presence of adverse selection and we also examine two general tests. First, with each model we examine whether larger trades are quoted relatively wide spreads, based on the familiar conclusion that the size of informed trades should vary positively with the likely magnitude of the traders' anticipated price move (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O'Hara, 1987 Financial customers tend to get better spreads because their trades reflect their view of the market, and their views are often shared with other asset managers. … With corporates you're just seeing their core business activities -car building or whatever. Almost all of them will tell you "we're not in the business of speculating."
There is by now ample empirical support for the claim that financial customers in FX are informed, on average, while corporate customers are not (Fan and Lyons, 2003; Froot and Ramadorai, 2005; Frömmel et al., 2008; Menkhoff and Schmeling, 2008; Bjønnes et al., 2011) . This would be surprising if nonfinancial corporate trades were dominated by capital issues, in which case the firms would presumably make an effort to guide their trades with informed forecasts of exchange-rate returns. In fact, however, the vast majority of corporate trades reflect mundane real-side concerns like the need to import inputs or pay taxes. One might likewise expect corporate trades to be informed if they rely on market-sensitive hedging strategies, but most non-financial firms review hedge ratios at most a few times yearly. Huang and Stoll (1997) 
The Huang and Stoll model
The term S/2 > 0 represents baseline half-spread, meaning the spread that would apply before adjustment for inventories, and υ t is a mean-zero random disturbance. If dealers manage existing inventories by shading prices to customers (e.g., quoting lower prices when inventory is high), then θ > 0.
Dealer i updates his expectation of the asset's fundamental value in light of the private information revealed by the direction of the previous trade and by public news, ε t :
The term λ(S/2) captures the information effect of trade direction and is a direct manifestation of adverse selection.
The public news shock, ε t , is serially uncorrelated. Combining the pricing and updating rules gives the following expression for price changes between transactions:
Here e t ≡ ε t + ∆υ t . We measure ∆P t ≡ P t -P t-1 in pips, which are roughly equivalent to basis points.
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Our dependent variable is the sequence of prices on transactions initiated by customers. We follow Huang and Stoll (1997) in estimating separate coefficients for trades in various size and customer-type categories, which we achieve by interacting the key reight-hand-side variables with appropriate dummy variables. Dealers report that they informally divide normal-sized customer transactions into regular trades, which vary from €1 million to about €25 million; modest trades; and tiny trades. Though the line between the latter two categories is ambiguous, their treatment can vary substantially: tiny trades are often spread by formula rather than by dealers' discretion. We therefore assign the following size ranges: large trades (Lg): {|Q t | ∈ [€1 million, € 25 million)}; medium trades (Md): {|Q t | ∈ [€0.5 million, €1 million)};
and small trades (Sm): {|Q t | ∈ (€0, € 0.5 million)}. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on trade sizes, returns, inventory, and order flow disaggregated by customer type.
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According to correspondents at large dealing banks, the correct customer disaggregation is between small corporate customers, on the one hand, and financial customers and large multinational (corporate) corporations, on the other. Though we cannot technically distinguish large multinationals from other corporate customers, large multinationals tend to trade through the biggest banks. Thus when our dataset distinguishes financial customers (FC) from corporate customers (CC), it roughly captures the distinction between informed and uninformed customers at our average-sized bank.
The results of estimating the Huang and Stoll (1997) model, shown in Table 5 , provide no support for any of the implications of adverse selection. The first model-specific implication is that there is a positive relation between trade size and the estimated adverse-selection coefficients, λ, but for financial traders the point estimates imply the opposite. The other model-specific prediction is that λ should be higher for financial than customer trades, but the only significant value of λ is associated with corporate trades.
Indeed, though the coefficients should all be positive under adverse selection they are jointly insignificant (chi-squared statistic 9.75, marginal significance 0.14).
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The first general prediction of adverse selection is that baseline half-spreads should be positively related to trade size, but the results in Table 5 The results of the Huang and Stoll (1997) model also suggest that dealers' inventory levels are not relevant to FX customer spreads, since none of the six inventory coefficients is significant; formal exclusion tests confirm their joint insignificance (chi-squared statistic is 3.64 with marginal significance 0.72).
Similar results have been found for roughly contemporaneous data from other banks, which has led to a broad consensus that FX dealers preferred managing inventory via interbank trades rather than by shading prices to customers during our sample period . Table 5 presents three robustness tests, all of which support the qualitative conclusions outlined above. First, we rerun the regression with inventories reset to zero at the beginning of every day. Second, we include interdealer as well as customer trades to provide comparability with , where customer transactions (as a single category) and interbank transactions are included in the main regressions. Reassuringly, our bank's baseline half-spread for normal-sized interbank transactions, 2.1 pips, is similar to those estimated for other banks. Third, we exclude forward transactions.
Our conclusion that adverse selection does not dominate the determination of customer spreads in the FX market is also robust to the following additional unreported modifications: excluding data for September 11, 2001; including additional lags of the dependent variable, with lag length of two suggested by the Akaike information criterion and other standard tests; and using a cutoff of €300,000 rather than €500,000 between small and medium trades.
The Madhavan and Smidt model
FX dealers consistently report that they consider large customer trades to be more informative than small ones, so the Huang and Stoll (1997) Lyons (1995) and ). In this model, agent j calls dealer i requesting a quote and chooses an amount Q jt that is related to the gap between his expected value of the asset, µ jt , and the price quoted by the dealer:
, where ξ > 0 and X jt represents agent j's liquidity demand. In setting his regret-free price, P t , dealer i considers his own expected value of the asset, µ t , his inventory, and the direction of the trade:
In determining µ i , dealer i rationally considers the customer's desired trade size. If the dealer shades prices to manage existing inventories, ζ < 0.
Solving for conditional expectations and taking first differences gives the following expression for the price change between dealer i's incoming transactions: Adverse selection should also influence the relation between β 1 and β 2 . The model implies that β 1 = |β 2 |/φ > 0 > β 2 , where 0 < φ < 1 is a model-derived parameter capturing the extent to which dealers rely on their priors rather than the current trade in updating µ t . Under adverse selection, the estimated value of φ should be closer to unity for uninformed trades. The model also implies that β 2 is the negative of the baseline half-spread and should thus be bigger (in absolute value) for informed trades.
The results of this analysis, presented in Table 6 , are no more favorable to adverse selection than estimates from the Huang and Stoll (1997) regressions. 8 The first model-specific implication is that the coefficient on trade size, δ, should be positive for informed customers, but the estimates of δ are only positive for corporate customers and are insignificant for both customer types. The ratio between the coefficients on lagged and current direction, φ = |β 2 |/β 1 , which should vary negatively with trade size, varies non-monotonically with size for the financial trades: the point estimates are 0.67, 0.99, and 0.66, respectively, for small, medium, and large financial trades. Similarly, though adverse selection predicts smaller values of φ for financial than corporate customers, estimates of φ for medium and large financial trades exceed corresponding estimates for corporate customers.
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With respect to the general implications of adverse selection, the estimated baseline half-spreads once again vary negatively, rather than positively, with trade size. For financial customers the estimated baseline half-spreads are a statistically-significant 8.9 pips on small trades and roughly one-third that size -and insignificantly different from zero -for medium and large trades. For corporate customers, the estimated half-spreads are 13.2 pips on small trades, 5.7 pips for medium trades, and essentially zero for large trades. In this regression the small-vs.-large distinction for financial customers and all size distinctions for corporate customers are statistically significant.
Contrary to adverse selection, the point estimates for the baseline half-spreads are higher for corporate than for financial customers. Though the differences are not significant in the baseline regression, they are significant when we exclude the inventory and quantity variables. This exclusion is statistically appropriate since inventories and the trade quantity itself are jointly insignificant (chi-squared statistic 3.36 with marginal significance 0.34), as they were for the Huang and Stoll (1997) model. 9 The constant term in the Madhavan and Smidt model is insignificant, implying that our dealer's preferred inventory level is about zero. The results are robust to numerous methodological modifications, the first three of which are reported in Table 6 : calculating inventories with a daily starting value of zero; including interbank trades; excluding forward transactions; excluding September 11, 2001; including two lags of the dependent variable; or splitting small and medium trades at €300,000 rather than €500,000.
The Glosten and Harris model
Since the inventory coefficients have been consistently insignificant, it may be appropriate to consider the Glosten and Harris (1988) 10 The period-t price change is:
The term c 0 should capture the baseline spread or, equivalently, fixed effects associated with trading; c 1 should capture any influence of trade size on spreads that is not driven by adverse selection; the adverseselection term, z, should be positive.
The results of this analysis, shown in Table 7 , provide no more support for adverse selection than our previous results. The two adverse-selection coefficients, z, are both insignificant, and the hypothesis that they are jointly insignificant is not rejected (F-statistic 1.18, marginal significance 0.31). In addition, contrary to the prediction of adverse-selection theory the baseline spreads for corporate customers are significantly larger than those for financial customers. Indeed, while we can reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients are the same (F-statistic 18.64, marginal significance 0.00), we cannot reject the hypothesis that the baseline spread for corporate customers is twice the baseline spread for financial customers (F-statistic 0.05, marginal significance 0.42). The results also confirm our earlier finding that trade size and baseline spreads are inversely related: the estimated values of c 1 are negative and significant for both corporate and financial customers. When, as before, we rerun the regressions including interbank trades or excluding forward trades, our qualitative conclusions are sustained.
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Operating costs, market power, and strategic dealing
According to the evidence just presented, price discovery in FX cannot follow the standard adverse-selection based model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) because dealers do not appear to adjust customer spreads to protect themselves against the likely information content of customer trades. Instead, the cross-sectional variation of FX customer spreads follows a pattern diametrically opposed to the one predicted by adverse selection: spreads are widest for the trades least likely to carry information. 11 This section highlights three factors that could drive this pattern: fixed operating costs, transitory market power, and strategic dealing.
Fixed operating costs
Per-unit processing costs fall as trade size rises, a point stressed by Angel (1996) and Hansch et al.
(1999) as a potential source of the inverse relationship between spreads and trade size on the London Stock Exchange. While this also seems likely to help explain the negative relation between spreads and trade size in the FX customer market, it is unlikely to explain the gap between spreads paid by financial and corporate customers. Fixed costs do not vary in any evident way by customer type, and marginal costs are, if anything, higher for asset managers, who often require their trade proceeds to be split among numerous individual funds.
One might wonder whether the difference between financial-and corporate-customer spreads reflects a difference in the timing of the two groups' trades. Though there are differences in timing, as noted in Section 2, interdealer spreads in euro-dollar are fairly constant at low levels throughout our bank's regular trading hours (Ito and Hashimoto, 2006) . In consequence, intraday trading patterns cannot predict the observed variation in customer spreads.
The rest of this section highlights two mutually consistent theories of dealing under asymmetric information that might explain the way FX spreads vary across counterparty types. The first theory suggests that information about current market conditions provides dealers with transitory market power relative to uninformed customers, allowing dealers to charge wider spreads to these customers. The second theory suggests that dealers strategically vary spreads across customers in an attempt to gather private information. 12 These information-based forces both imply that dealers will set wider spreads on smaller trades and on corporate trades, and we hypothesize that they operate simultaneously with fixed operating costs. The factors we highlight in this section do not exhaust the long list of factors dealers consider in setting spreads -though a longer list of factors could exhaust the patience of our readers. This "market-power" hypothesis can be applied directly to explain why corporate FX customers pay wider spreads than financial customers. Currencies are traded in dealership markets with dispersed information, and there are numerous reasons why corporate customers might be less sophisticated than financial customers. Corporate trades are typically scattered across time and often across currencies, so the firms do not hire professional traders. Instead, they assign FX trading to administrators with many other responsibilities. It is difficult for these individuals to gain an intuitive understanding of the market, a difficulty often compounded during our sample period by a lack of real-time market information. Further, these individuals are rarely evaluated on execution quality, so they have little incentive to achieve better spreads. In short, traders at corporate firms perceive that search is very costly and yet provides small benefits, making them ripe targets for wide spreads.
Market power
FX traders at financial firms, who are often professionals, perceive lower costs to search because they have plenty of real-time information and greater benefits from search because they are often evaluated on execution quality. Financial firms may also gain market power from their tendency to undertake larger trades (see Table 1 ). As shown in Bernhardt et al. (2005) , customers who regularly trade substantial amounts may receive better spreads as dealers compete for their business.
Strategic dealing
The gap between corporate and financial spreads may also reflect the strategic efforts of dealers to attract informed order flow by selectively setting attractive quotes. The importance of gathering information from customers is indicated by comments from William Clyde, the former trading-floor manager:
Banks will want to make good quotes on large, potentially information-bearing amounts for two reasons. First, it gets them better access to the current information: in addition to getting the directional information won by being dealt on, the caller will sometimes share a little additional information with the bank. With this information you don't get caught out and you can make better trading decisions. Second, it ensures that institutions with large amounts continue to call whenever they have something going on.
The two-tier structure of FX makes it logical for FX dealers try to capture informative customer order flow, since they can exploit the information in subsequent interdealer trading. 13 Evidence that the order flow of large currency dealing banks is informed is provided in Evans and Lyons (2007) and Rime et al. (2009) , inter alia. Bjønnes et al. (2011) provide evidence that the interdealer trades of relatively small banks even carry information, on average, though they carry less information than the trades of big banks.
The insight that market makers might strategically manipulate spreads to increase the information value of incoming order flow was originally explored in Leach and Madhavan (1992) . That work uses an equity-market inspired model to demonstrate that market makers in one-tier markets may adjust prices early in a trading session to enhance later profitability. Flood et al. (1999) present evidence for such intertemporal manipulation of spreads in an experimental setting similar to the FX interdealer market. Our evidence, however, concerns cross-sectional rather than intertemporal variation in spreads. Naik et al. (1999) presents a model of strategic dealing in a two-tier market in which some customers are informed.
They conclude that customer spreads will be narrower for more informed customers, consistent with the pattern we document for FX. Hansch and Neuberger (1996) present evidence consistent with this type of strategic dealing on the London Stock Exchange.
Our bank's order flow need not be hugely informative for strategic dealing considerations to influence its customer spreads. Since dealers are largely price takers with respect to spreads (Cheung and Chinn, 2001) , strategic dealing will indirectly influence spreads at moderate-sized banks as long as it directly influences spreads at the largest banks.
14 Evidence for strategic dealing in FX is presented in Ramadorai (2008) , who analyzes the transactions of asset managers. He finds that spreads are narrower for managers that produce higher (riskadjusted) FX returns and are therefore presumably better informed. Reitz et al. (2009) provide evidence for the broader claim, implied by both the market power and the strategic dealing hypotheses, that financial customers have more bargaining power than corporate customers vis-à-vis their dealers.
Price discovery in foreign exchange
The evidence presented here suggests that spreads in the FX customer market are not positively related to a trade's information content. Indeed, the price moves more when uninformed customers trade than when informed customers trade, on average. This raises a logical follow-up question: If adverse selection is not the basis for price discovery in currency markets, what is? This section first proposes an alternative price discovery process that reflects the FX market's two-tiered structure. It then shows that this process predicts many of the stylized facts of currency market microstructure. The section finishes by providing new evidence consistent with the alternative process.
According to our proposed price discovery process, information moves from customers to market prices in three stages. In the first stage, an informed customer trades with a dealer, but the customer's information is not reflected in the dealer's quoted price. In the second stage, the information moves inter-dealer prices when dealers trade with each other. In the third stage, the information finally affects customer prices when dealers trade with more customers.
Any comprehensive formalization of this process awaits the resolution of technical constraints in the literature. The dynamics of limit-order markets with asymmetric information are so complex that models only yield closed-form solutions under highly constrained assumptions. But the complexities of our hypothesis exceed even these, since it involves the interaction of an order-driven (interdealer) market with a quote-driven (customer) market, both under asymmetric information. Fortunately, all the key conceptual elements of our proposed process have been formally elaborated in the literature: our contribution is to articulate a synthesis appropriate for FX.
The mechanism
This section describes in greater detail the three stages of our proposed price discovery process.
Stage 1. An informed customer contacts his dealer to trade. In contrast to the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, the FX customer's market-relevant information is not immediately impounded in the dealer's quotes.
Stage 2. A customer's information influences the interdealer price. The dealer infers some or all of the customer's information and uses it to guide his own trades. Our key hypothesis is that dealers have a stronger tendency to place market orders after informed-customer trades than after uninformed-customer trades. This hypothesis draws on existing theoretical analyses of order choice and the institutional structure of FX markets.
Consider a dealer whose inventory begins at zero and then rises because a customer decides to sell.
Since FX dealers prefer to have zero inventory, this dealer will likely try to offload the new inventory to another dealer. As described in Section 2, dealers can trade through the limit-order markets run by the interdealer brokers or they can trade directly in the OTC market. Our analysis carries through regardless of this choice, as described below.
Suppose first that our dealer trades through a broker. In this case he submits either a market sell or a limit sell. Market orders provide immediate execution with certainty, while limit orders provide better prices but uncertain execution (Harris, 1998; Foucault, 1999) . This choice depends on whether the cus-tomer is informed (Reiss and Werner, 1998) . If so, the dealer has three incentives to exploit the immediacy offered by market orders: (i) he has information and might rationally speculate, other things equal; (ii) he has inventory with its inherent risk; and (iii) his information indicates that his inventory could soon bring a loss. Our dealer therefore seems likely to place a market sell order and earn the lower bid price.
The amount sold could exceed the new inventory if the dealer chooses to open a speculative short position. The structure of the interdealer market itself matches in critical respects the one analyzed in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , so regret-free interbank prices should reflect the dealer's information. If the customer is considered uninformed, the dealer has only one incentive to place a market order − the inherent riskiness of his inventory, so the dealer is more likely to place a limit order.
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Putting the pieces together, we see that after an informed customer sale the interdealer prices is likely to fall and after an uninformed customer sale the interdealer price is not likely to fall. The connection to price discovery is direct: brokered interdealer prices tend to move in the direction indicated by informed trades.
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If our dealer chooses to trade in the over-the-counter market, this analysis changes only superficially. Calling another dealer, like placing a market order, produces a quick, certain trade at a relatively undesirable price; waiting for someone else to call, like placing a limit order, could bring a better price but could instead bring no trade at all. A dealer has strong incentives to call another dealer after buying from an informed customer, in which case he sells at the lower bid price. After trading with an uninformed customer, the dealer is more likely to wait for incoming calls and the price is less likely to fall.
Stage 3. Market-relevant information influences customer prices. Once the interdealer quotes reflect the new information, subsequent customer trades with other dealers will also reflect that information.
The price discovery process just outlined could theoretically lead to a no-trade equilibrium in the interdealer market in which all market orders would be placed by dealers with information, uninformed dealers would have no source of profits, and trading would cease. Such an equilibrium would require three conditions to be satisfied, however, and none of them hold true. First, speculation must be the only motive driving trades; in reality, however, many dealer trades are driven instead by the need to offload inventory. (Indeed, customer service -not speculative interbank trading -is the main source of profits for small and mid-sized bank dealers, as shown in Mende and Menkhoff (2006) .) Second, customer identity must be the only factor determining whether a dealer makes an aggressive trade; in reality, however, this choice is influenced by many other factors, including volatility and depth (Menkhoff et al., 2010) . Third, customer identity must indicate flawlessly whether and when a customer is informed, but in reality informed customers sometimes trade for liquidity reasons.
Explaining the stylized facts
Our proposed price discovery process predicts a number of the stylized facts in FX microstructure.
First, it predicts that the relatively-informed financial order flow will be positively related to upcoming exchange-rate returns. Evidence for such a relationship is provided in , Marsh and O'Rourke (2005) , and Evans and Lyons (2007) . If the information in question is fundamental, then our analysis also predicts that this relationship is substantially permanent, evidence for which is provided in Lyons (2001) and in Bjønnes et al. (2011) .
Our proposed price discovery process also predicts a positive and largely permanent relationship between exchange rates and interdealer order flow. Consistent with this prediction, substantial evidence indicates a strong and positive contemporaneous correlation between interdealer order flow and exchange-rate returns at the daily and weekly horizons, and a substantial portion of this relationship is permanent (Osler (2009) provides a survey).
Our proposed price discovery process also answers a natural question regarding the strategic dealing hypothesis: If dealers quote narrower spreads to attract informed customers, how do the dealers benefit from that information? We answer: they benefit via enhanced interdealer trading. The information permits them to reduce their inventory risk and/or to take informed speculative positions.
Additional evidence
Our proposed price discovery process has four additional testable implications. First, it predicts that interdealer prices are the best measure of "the market" at any instant. Abundant institutional evidence confirms this implication. Most critically, dealers' standard practice is to base their customer quotes on the interdealer market's current best bid and offer. Second, our proposed price discovery process predicts that dealers with the most financial customers should be best informed and should profit the most from interdealer trading, consistent with the findings in Bjønnes et al. (2011) .
The last two testable implications of our proposed price discovery process concern the likelihood of aggressive interbank transactions. Under our proposed price discovery mechanism, dealers should be more likely to place interdealer market orders after trades with financial customers than after trades with corporate customers. Similarly, dealers should be more likely to place interdealer market orders after large trades than after small ones, other things equal. If our hypothesis is not correct -and information from individual customers is not critical to the dealers' decision to make or take liquidity -then customer type and trade size should not matter after controlling for the dealer's inventory level and other factors.
We test these last two implications using a probit analysis of the conditional probability that a given transaction is aggressive in the interbank market, given the nature of the previous trade:
The first three variables are dummies indicating that the previous trade was with a financial customer, FC t-1 , or with a corporate customer, CC t-1 , and a dummy set to one if the value of the previous transaction exceeds €10, 10mio t-1 . We conjecture that the coefficient on FC t-1 will exceed the coefficient on the corporate dummy and the coefficient on 10mio t-1 will be positive.
The last three terms in Equation (5) capture other factors relevant to the decision to place a market order. The coefficient on absolute inventory, |I t |, should be positive, since higher inventory brings higher inventory risk. The influence of inventory seems likely to diminish as inventories get larger, so we follow by including squared inventory, I t 2 . The absolute size of the current transaction, |Q t |, is included because our dealer's customer transactions are often smaller than $1 million, the minimum size for brokered trades. Since our dealer prefers to carry out interbank trades on EBS, a broker, rather than by dealing directly, he seems likely to collect inventory from small customer transactions and then square his position by submitting one relatively substantial market order.
The results of estimating Equations (5), shown in column one of Table 8 , support our view that the likelihood of an aggressive interbank transaction is higher when the previous transaction is considered informed. Aggressive interbank transactions are significantly more likely when the previous transaction involves a financial customer than when it involves a corporate customer. They are also significantly more likely after trades over €10 million.
[ Table 8 around here]
The economic magnitudes of these effects can be gauged by calculating the probability of an aggressive interbank trade for different types of previous trades, with other variables evaluated at sample means. After a normal-sized corporate trade the estimated probability of an aggressive interbank transaction is 9.6 percent; after a similarly sized financial trade, that probability is roughly twice as large, at 18.9 percent. After a corporate trade over €10 million, the probability of an aggressive interbank transaction is 26.3 percent. After a similarly sized financial trade, this probability reaches 41.6 percent.
Our analysis has the further implication that the likelihood of an aggressive aggressive trade is higher when the direction of the aggressive trade is similar to the direction of the previous incoming trade.
For example, if the previous trade was a financial-customer purchase, then the likelihood that the dealer responds aggressively is higher if the dealer is also choosing to make a purchase. 17 To capture this insight,
we run an expanded version of the regression outlined above, in which dummy variables capture whether the current trade has the same direction as the previous trade. One same-direction dummy applies to financial customers (SD-FC t-1 ), and the other applies to corporate customers (SD-CC t-1 ):
The results of this regression, shown in column 2 of Table 8 , indicate as before that dealers are more likely to make aggressive interbank trade after informed trades with others. As expected, the results indicate that the likelihood is far higher when the current trade is in the same direction as the previous trade. For large corporate trades the likelihood of an aggressive same-direction trade, 56 percent, is over twice the likelihood of an aggressive other-direction trade, 22 percent; for large financial trades these probabilities are 77 percent and 32 percent. 17 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this implication.
In the baseline results, the inventory terms are statistically insignificant. Since find inventories significant in related regressions, we also run the regression using our other measure of inventory -sometimes preferred in currency microstructure -in which each day's starting value is set to zero. This modification leaves our main conclusions unaffected but inventories themselves become statistically significant. As anticipated, inventories have a positive and concave relation to the likelihood the dealer trades aggressively in the interbank market.
Our proposed process implies that our dealer should also tend to trade more aggressively after incoming trades by other dealers. Existing evidence suggests that our bank is likely to consider other banks to be better informed, on average (Bjønnes et al., 2011) . Banks of all sizes have information, but banks with the most customers are best informed, and our bank has a relatively modest customer base compared with the likes of Citibank and Deutsche Bank. To test whether our bank tends to view other banks as informed, we include incoming interbank trades as a determinant of order aggressiveness. As expected, the results indicate that our bank trades more aggressively after incoming trades by other dealers than it does after corporate trades (Table 8 , column 4). Other properties of the regression are unaffected. Our main conclusions are also insensitive to the inclusion of forward trades (Table 8 , column 5), and to the exclusion of September 11, 2001 (unreported) .
Conclusions
This paper examines the process of price discovery in FX markets. Our benchmark is the standard model of spread determination in equity markets (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) , in which adverse selection concerns lead dealers to set wider spreads when they expect customers to be informed. Using the complete USD/EUR trading record of a bank in Germany over a period of four months, the paper first provides evidence that the spreads quoted to foreign-exchange end users/customers do not behave as predicted by adverse selection. Instead, FX customer spreads narrow with the likelihood that a customer is informed: they are wider for small trades than for large trades and they are wider for the relatively uninformed corporate customers than for financial customers. Other implications of adverse selection are also not supported for customer FX trades. We infer that the standard adverse selection model does not adequately describe the price discovery process in FX.
The paper then highlights three hypotheses from the broader microstructure literature that can help explain the cross-sectional variation of currency spreads. First, since dealers' operating costs are largely fixed, it would be natural for spreads to be larger for small trades. The wider spreads paid by corporate customers cannot be explained by operating costs but could be explained in part by Green et al.'s (2007) market-power hypothesis. This asserts that spreads in quote-driven markets vary positively with a dealer's transitory market power relative to a given customer, and that such market power derives in part from knowledge of market conditions. Corporate customers tend to know the least about current market conditions, so this theory correctly predicts they pay the widest spreads. The customer-based variation in spreads could also reflect dealers' attempts to strategically gather information (Leach and Madhavan, 1992; Naik et al., 1999) . Dealers may narrow spreads to attract informed customers and extract information from their trades, information from which the dealers can benefit in subsequent interdealer trades.
Dealers consider financial order flow to be relatively informative, so this theory correctly predicts that financial customers pay the narrowest spreads.
The final section of the paper proposes a new price discovery process that incorporates the FX market's two-tiered structure. The pattern of spreads shows that a customer's information is not immediately embedded in the prices quoted to it by dealers, which means that price discovery must take place in the interdealer market. We suggest that price discovery is driven by a difference in how dealers trade after providing liquidity to informed and uninformed customers. After trades with informed customers they tend to make parallel aggressive trades in the interdealer market − placing a market buy order after an informed customer buy, for example − which moves the interdealer price in a direction consistent with the customer's information. After trading with uninformed customers, by contrast, dealers are more likely to place parallel limit orders or to wait for incoming calls, leaving the interdealer price relatively unaffected. Because later customer quotes are based on the new interdealer prices, the information spreads to all prices once it is affects the interdealer price.
Our theory predicts some key stylized facts in FX, specifically the positive and substantially permanent relation between cumulative financial order flow and exchange rates, as well as the positive and substantially permanent relation between interdealer order flow and exchange rates. Our theory also predicts that dealers are more likely to place aggressive interdealer trades after informed customer trades, and we provide evidence consistent with this implication.
Customer spreads are known to vary inversely with trade size in other liquid two-tier markets, including the U.S. Treasury market, the U.S. corporate bond markets, and the London Stock Exchange.
Future research could investigate the extent to which the price discovery process proposed here applies in these markets. 
∆P it is the change in price between two successive customer trades measured in pips. D t is +1 for buyinitiated trades and -1 for sell-initiated trades. I t is the dealer's inventory, measured in EUR millions. These variables are interacted with dummy variables for trades with financial customers (FC) and trades with corporate customers (CC). They are also interacted with dummies for trade size: Lg. = {|Q jt | ∈ [1,∞)}; Md. = {|Q jt | ∈ [0.5,1)}; Sm. = {|Q jt | ∈ (0,0.5)}. The table shows the euro-dollar trading activity of a bank in Germany over the 87 trading days between July 11, 2001, and November 9, 2001 . Estimation uses GMM and Newey-West standard errors. Significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels indicated by ‡, † and *, respectively. Constant term suppressed. Estimates of the baseline half-spread are highlighted in bold. The dependent variable is the change in price between two successive incoming trades, measured in pips. D t is an indicator variable picking up the direction of the deal, positive for purchases (at the ask) and negative for sales (at the bid); I t is the dealer's inventory at time t, and Q jt is order flow measured in millions of euros. These variables are interacted with dummy variables for financial customers (FC) and corporate customers (CC). They are also interacted with dummies for trade size: Lg. = {Q jt ∈ [1,∞)}; Md. = {Q jt ∈ [0.5,1)}; Sm. = {Q jt ∈ (0,0.5)}. The table shows the euro-dollar trading activity of a bank in Germany over the 87 trading days between July 11, 2001, and November 9, 2001 . Estimation uses GMM and Newey-West correction. Significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels indicated by ‡, † and *, respectively. Estimates of the (negative of the) baseline half-spread are highlighted in bold. is a dummy coded 1 if the previous counterparty was a financial customer, CC t-1 and IB t-1 are defined similarly for corporate customers and other banks. SDFC (SDCC) is a dummy coded 1 if the current dealer trade has the same direction as the previous financial-customer (corporate-customer) trade. 10 mio t-1 is a dummy coded 1 if the size of the previous transaction was €10 million or larger. I represents inventories, in millions of euros; |Q jt | represents the absolute size of the current deal, measured in EUR millions; Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels indicated by ‡, † and *, respectively. 
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